By Natan Sharansky 24-7-2015
Natan Sharansky, a human rights
activist and former political prisoner in the Soviet Union, is chairman of the
Jewish Agency for Israel.
These days, like many Israelis and American Jews, I
find myself in a precarious and painful situation. Those of us who believe that
the nuclear agreement just signed between world powers and Iran is dangerously
misguided are now compelled to criticize Israel’s best friend and ally, the
government of the United States. In standing up for what we think is right, for
both our people and the world, we find ourselves at odds with the power best
able to protect us and promote stability. And instead of joining the hopeful
chorus of those who believe peace is on the horizon, we must risk giving the
impression that we somehow prefer war.
As difficult as this situation is, however, it is not
unprecedented. Jews have been here before, 40 years ago, at a historic juncture
no less frightening or fateful than today’s.
In the early 1970s, Republican President Richard
Nixon inaugurated his policy of detente with the Soviet Union with an extremely
ambitious aim: to end the Cold War by normalizing relations between the two
superpowers.
Among the obstacles Nixon faced was the USSR’s
refusal to allow on-site inspections of its weapons facilities. Moscow did not
want to give up its main advantage, a closed political system that prevented
information and people from escaping and prevented prying eyes from looking in.
Yet the Soviet Union, with its very rigid and
atrophied economy, badly needed cooperation with the free world, which Nixon
was prepared to offer. The problem was that he was not prepared to demand
nearly enough from Moscow in return. And so as Nixon moved to grant the Soviet
Union most-favored-nation status, and with it the same trade benefits as U.S.
allies, Democratic Sen. Henry Jackson of Washington proposed what became ahistoric amendment,
conditioning the removal of sanctions on the Soviet Union’s allowing free
emigration for its citizens.
By that time, tens of thousands of Soviet Jews had
asked permission to leave for Israel. Jackson’s amendment sought not only to
help these people but also and more fundamentally to change the character of
detente, linking improved economic relations to behavioral change by the USSR.
Without the free movement of people, the senator insisted, there should be no
free movement of goods.
The Republican administration in the White House
objected furiously. It also claimed that by improving relations with Moscow it
would be better able to protect us personally and to ensure that some Jews
could emigrate each year. This put Jewish activists inside the USSR in a difficult
position. We feared opposing our greatest benefactor, yet we wanted freedom for
all Soviet Jews, and we believed that would result only from unrelenting
pressure to bring down the Iron Curtain. This is why, despite the clear risks
and KGB threats, we chose to publicly support the amendment.
American Jewish organizations also faced a difficult
choice. They were reluctant to speak out against the U.S. government and appear
to put the “narrow” Jewish interest above the cause of peace. Yet they also realized
that the freedom of all Soviet Jews was at stake, and they actively supported
the policy of linkage.
Now all that was needed for the amendment to become
law was enough principled congressional Republicans willing to take a stand
against their own party in the White House. It was a Republican senator from
New York, Jacob Javits, who, spurred by a sense of responsibility for the
Jewish future, helped put together the bipartisan group that ensured passage.
Later, when Javits traveled to Moscow as part of a
delegation of U.S. senators, he met with a group of Jewish refuseniks and asked
us whether the policy of linkage truly helped our cause. Although we knew that
we were speaking directly into KGB listening devices, all 14 of us confirmed
that Jackson’s amendment was our only hope.
The Soviet authorities were infuriated by the law and
did everything in their power to prove that the Americans had made a mistake.
Jewish emigration was virtually halted, and the repression of Jewish activists
increased. In 1977, I was arrested and accused of high treason, allegedly as a
spy for the CIA; in the indictment, Jackson was listed as my main accomplice.
Yet far from discouraging me or discrediting the senator, the many mentions of
his name in my sentence gave me hope — hope that the free world would not
permit Soviet dictators to continue denying their citizens basic rights and
that in the end our cause would be victorious.
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