The campaign to place pressure on Israel through
activism on the international stage is the latest example.
Jonathan Spyer May 7th 2014
So April 29th has passed, and the
nine-month period allotted by the current U.S. administration for its effort to
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute has come and gone. Entirely
predictably, it has failed, in its entirety.
What can be learned from the failure? And what may be
expected to happen now?
The failure of the talks was predictable first and
foremost because of the irreconcilable positions of the sides. This
is not a matter of small details, as is sometimes maintained. It
isn’t that the Palestinians want 99% of the West Bank while Israel will offer
only 98%.
Palestinian nationalism in both its Fatah and Hamas
variants rejects the possibility of accepting the permanence of Jewish
statehood in any part of the area west of the Jordan River.
For the Palestinian Authority, the nine-month period of
negotiations came as an unwelcome interruption to a very different strategy to
which it will now return. This strategy consists of an attempt to
place pressure on Israel through action in international forums to isolate and
delegitimize the Jewish state. Presumably the intended result of
this is to induce Israel eventually to make concessions in return for nothing.
The struggle would then continue for further concessions.
This strategy is unlikely to bear fruit, but its
adoption follows a notable pattern in Palestinian politics – namely, the
constant attempt to find an alternative to a negotiated peace based on
compromise.
At the root of Palestinian perceptions is a very
notable strategic optimism.
The Palestinians see themselves as part of the local
majority Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslim culture. From this point of
view, the establishment of a non-Muslim sovereignty in Israel was not only an
injustice, it was also an anomaly. Israel, being an anomaly, is
therefore bound eventually to be defeated and disappear. So there is
no need to reconcile to it, with all the humiliation therein.
This core perception leads to the momentary embrace of
all kinds of unlikely strategies, which are invested with tremendous hopes.
This pattern has been around for a while.
In the 1970s, in their first incarnation as an
independent national movement, Palestinians believed that the long war strategy
of the Palestinian terror organizations would serve to hollow out and destroy
the hated Zionist entity, on the model of the FLN in Algeria.
In 1990/91, almost forgotten now, Palestinians en masse
embraced the empty promises of Saddam Hussein to “burn half of Israel.”
Arafat went to Baghdad to embrace the Iraqi dictator.
In 2000, after the short Oslo period, Palestinians
looked to Hizballah and its ideology of resistance as the model for what they
hoped would be a successful military and terror campaign against Israel.
All these strategies failed. All turned out
to be based on illusion.
In the meantime, the Jewish state went from strength to
strength – absorbing millions of new immigrants, leaping ahead economically,
diplomatically and militarily.
The campaign to place pressure on Israel through
activism on the international stage is the latest example of this Palestinian
magical thinking. It is likely to share the fate of its
predecessors. The noisy BDS movement notwithstanding, Israel’s
position on the global stage remains strong.
Its alliance with the U.S., despite the utter lack of
warmth from the current administration, remains strong at its core, reflected
in cooperation on myriad levels, both military and economic.
Israel is forging ahead in constructing positive
relationships with the emergent powers of India and China. It
maintains very close and warm relations with Canada, Australia, Germany and
other important western players. None of this is under threat from
the automatic majority the Palestinians enjoy at the UN because of the Arab and
Muslim blocs of states.
So Palestinian optimism regarding the model for
defeating Israel is hard to understand. But then the faith placed in
the previous approaches noted above also made little apparent sense.
What we are in for now is a period in which the current
chimera will need to be played out. On the bright side, this means
that a return to large-scale political violence is unlikely. The
Palestinians were defeated heavily in the 2000-4 period, and there is little
energy for a return to war.
The Palestinian elite and their children live
comfortable and privileged lives in Ramallah and elsewhere in the region and
beyond it. Combining this with diplomatic and political activity can
be pleasant and rewarding. Combining it with military activity, by
contrast, could be harmful and has already been proven not to work.
So expect more furious and pathos-filled denunciations
of Israeli crimes from various UN committees largely staffed by the
representatives of sundry dictatorships.
Expect Saeb Erekat and the others to come up with yet
more inventive reasons as to why Islam and Arabic are “indigenous” to Jerusalem
while Judaism and Hebrew represent foreign implants. And so on, and
so forth.
And at the end of all this, expect more failure, more
bewilderment and a pause until the next alternative to a negotiated peace is
stumbled upon. This is the nature of the magical thinking
that lies at the core of Palestinian Arab politics.
This politics, in its various manifestations, exists to
reverse the verdict of the war of 1948. It has no other purpose.
Its credo was perfectly rendered in the
words of the Moroccan scholar Abdallah Laroui, as quoted by Fouad Ajami: “On a
certain day everything would be obliterated and instantaneously reconstructed
and the new inhabitants would leave, as if by magic, the land they had
despoiled; in this way will justice be dispensed to the victims, on that day
when the presence of God shall again make itself felt.’
The language is elegant. The message is one of
politicide and destruction. For as long as this credo remains at the root of
Palestinian politics, peace between Israelis and Palestinians will remain
unachievable. All else is mere detail.
Very well thought-out commentary
ReplyDelete